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Abstract 
 
The chapter looks at power in the origins and evolution of the Biological & 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). It begins by looking at the origins of 
what some have termed a taboo surrounding poison weapons, before 
turning to look at the role of different forms of power in the genesis of the 
BWC in the late 1960s. The article proceeds to look at the role of 
institutional power in the evolution of the convention before turning to the 
limitations generated by the diffused nature of power. The chapter 
concludes by exploring the literature on public administration, particularly 
Lindblom’s notion of ‘incrementalism’ to outline how the BWC is essentially 
‘muddling through’ and to some extent is largely limited to muddling 
through because of the consensus rule and the limits of productive power 
within the BWC. 
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Introduction  
A great deal has been written about the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BWC), yet there have been few attempts to look at the convention through the lens of 
international relations (IR) theories generally, yet alone IR theories focused on power. 
This is perhaps because those more developed and detailed efforts to look at the 
convention have largely eschewed international relations theory in favour of what they 
may see as more policy relevant approaches and/or simply focused on an account of the 
history and/or politics of the convention.  
Yet it is also perhaps a result of the difficulties for academics in decrypting codified 
diplomatic statements and determining what exactly happens ‘behind closed doors’ in 
certain negotiations (domestic and international) and therefore generating meaningful 
claims over how power has been employed in the construction and evolution of the 
convention. Those on the inside are obliged to guard such information quite carefully 
and frequently remain reluctant to disclose too much; those on the outside are often 
dependent on informed guesswork, anecdotes and off the record comments all of which 
make an analysis of power difficult. Alternatively it is perhaps because of the 
complexity of power relations within the context of biological disarmament and the 
associated difficulties in unpicking the role of different – yet interconnected - forms of 
power, exerted by different actors, at different times in the regimes history.  
It is for these reasons that this paper approaches the role of power in the BWC with a 
degree of caution and, rather than attempting to boldly lay claims to fill a lacuna in the 
study of power in the BWC, is more of a modest attempt to begin to apply thinking 
around power, as conceived by Barnett and Duvall (2005) in Power in International 
Politics (and outlined in the introduction to this special issues), to looking at the genesis 
and evolution of the BWC.  
With this in mind, the article begins by looking at the formation of what some see as a 
‘taboo’ surrounding poison attending to physiological, psychological but also power 
based explanations for the emergence of the ‘taboo’. The paper then proceeds to look 
at two areas in which the manifestation of power has been significant. The first lies in 
the genesis of the BWC, paying particular attention to the complex web of factors that 
may - or may not - have influenced Nixon’s unilateral renunciation of biological 
weapons in 1969. The second relates to the discussions over the course of the Sixth and 
Seventh Review Conferences to the BWC, two events that provide insights into the role 
– and exploitation - of institutional power in the BWC.  
The paper proceeds to highlight how other forms of power have manifest in the 
evolution of the convention before concluding by outlining how the distributed nature 
of power within current approach to the BWC has reduced the evolution of the 
convention to a process of ‘incrementalism’ or ‘muddling through’. Drawing on the 
work of Lindblom (1959, 1979), it is argued that such a process of muddling through - 
as opposed to revolutionary paradigm shifting change - whilst doubtless frustrating for 
many longstanding friends of the convention and indeed those involved in the on-going 
process of disarmament diplomacy - may not be an entirely bad thing in circumstances 
where the convention is neither in crisis nor at a cross roads, but rather continues to 
trundle along to an albeit as yet undecided location.   
 
Origins of the Poison taboo 
It is often remarked that the hostile exploitation of infection (and toxicity) is subject to 
a longstanding, cross-cultural taboo (Jefferson, 2014; Price, 1997) and indeed over the 
course of history there is ample – if sometimes ambiguous - evidence of condemnations 
of the use of poison from a number of different sources (Zanders, 2003). For some 
scholars such obloquy arises from the intrinsic qualities of infective weapons or an 
inherent psychological aversion to the notion of contamination and the destruction of 
the body from within through the use of poison. For others the stigmatization of poison 
derives from the barbaric, cowardly and or treacherous nature of violence, something 
illustrated in statement attributed to Caliph Abu-Bakr, who reportedly “Exhorted his 
troops to overcome their enemies by bravery and never by poison” (Zanders, 2003).  
Yet a genealogical examination of this taboo, as taken forward by scholar such as Price 
(1997), suggests there are perhaps deeper explanations for the obloquy associated with 
poison weapons (a label which arguably includes biological weapons), which reflect 
the use of what Barnett and Duvall (2005) describe as productive power. An exploration 
of productive power involves inter alia exploring how “diffuse and contingent social 
processes produce particular kinds of subjects, fix meanings and categories, and create 
what is taken for granted and the ordinary of world politics”; and, in the case of the 
stigmatization of poison it is perhaps telling how early discourse on poison fixed the 
prohibited and accepted forms of violence, arguably in the interests of particular sets of 
actors. For instance, Grotius (1625: section XV) deemed the use of poison and poisoned 
weapons prohibited, but suggested the ban on poison “originated with kings, whose 
lives are better defended by arms than those of other men, but are less safe from poison’; 
whereas Hallissy (1987: 6), suggests poison remains an “insidious equalizer of strength 
in the battle of the sexes” where in a “weak woman planning a poison is as deadly as a 
man with a gun”, leading to speculation as to whether gender could perhaps be a further 
factor which influenced the process of stigmatizing the use of poison in warfare.   
Whatever the origins of the obloquy associated with poison weapons, it is apparent that, 
in contrast to a number of other means and methods of warfare, the notion of poison as 
somehow unacceptable as a tool in warfare appears to have stood the test of time. With 
successive agreements converting moral opprobrium into national and international law. 
A key example here is the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the ‘‘the use in war 
of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices’’ along with ‘‘bacteriological methods of warfare’’. Such a prohibition was 
binding only in warfare and upon those high contracting parties. Moreover, by focusing 
on ‘bacteriological’ weapons, as opposed to the broader category of biological weapons, 
the protocol represented a context-based understanding of the science, which arguably 
omitted other forms of biological weapons such as virus, rickettsia, fungi and toxins 
that remained outside its the category of ‘bacteriological’ per se.  
 
The Genesis of the Biological Weapons Convention  
The limitation of the Geneva Protocol led to a number of efforts to further develop the 
CBW regime in the run up the Second World War. However the outbreak of war 
scuppered such agreements and it was not until later that states once again gave serious 
attention to chemical and biological disarmament.  As with the origins of the poison 
taboo, there remain a number of competing explanations for the genesis of the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  
This section provides an outline of the evolution of efforts to bolster the Geneva 
protocol, paying particular attention to the competing explanations for Nixon’s 
unilateral renunciation of biological weapons in 1969; an act that paved the way for the 
creation of the BWC. Notably, it is beyond the scope of this paper to reach any form of 
definitive conclusions as to the reasoning behind Nixon’s renunciation, rather the paper 
explores the role of different actors and different forms of power that, in varying 
degrees, appear to have had a possible role in Nixon’s decision.   
After an apparent period of dormancy in discussions surrounding chemical and 
biological weapons from the mid-1930s, discussion around CBW picked up again in 
the 1960s, with efforts to revisit and respond to limitation in the Geneva protocol. 
Although proposals to ban biological weapons were mooted in the US in the post 
Second World War era, at that time “it just wasn’t politically possible” in the US (Frank, 
1974). However, following the completion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) in 1968, there was growing appetite in Britain for separate chemical from 
biological weapons and tackle the latter first on the grounds that: “it may be easier” 
(CCD, 1968: pg 34). 
The British suggestion was perhaps pragmatic and principled, yet it is also likely to 
have been informed by the UK’s interests at the time and several factors need to be 
taken into consideration in this regard. First, the UK had tested the hydrogen bomb in 
1957, and subsequently, Balmer (2001) suggests, “the importance of biological warfare 
in defence policy began to decline”. Secondly, the UK considered the BW of limited 
value in its arsenal but recognised it posed a serious threat to the UK. Finally, the UK 
would have been aware that the US could not have accepted a joint CBW Convention, 
and both states were “apprehensive about opening up the US-USSR debate on tear gas” 
which would have been a politically embarrassing process, exploited to the discomfit 
of the United States (CIA, 1969: 14). As such the emergence of a separate category of 
biological weapons, distinct from chemical weapons can arguably be seen, in part, as a 
result of the application of productive power. Although this was initially met with a 
lukewarm response by the US and outright opposition from Eastern Group countries it 
was a step toward a prohibition on biological warfare that was taken yet further forward 
by Nixon a year later through the unilateral renunciation of biological weapons on the 
25th November 1969, a move that was described by Sweden (1969) as the “only true 
disarmament measure” in the post-war period. 
 
The Nixon Decision  
Much has been written on Nixon’s renunciation of biological weapons, yet it still 
remains somewhat unclear as to exactly why the decision was taken and the relative 
importance – if any – of several different factors that may or may not have informed 
the decision.  What is clear is that, contrary to some suggestions; the decision was not 
taken because the US government deemed biological weapons militarily useless. On 
the contrary the success of decades of testing of offensive germ warfare capabilities 
demonstrated in theory at least what the US Army Chemical Corps (1959) termed the 
“feasibility of covering large areas of a country with BW agents”. Yet whilst biological 
weapons would not have been seen as useless per se, they were fraught with uncertainty 
particularly over the predictability, controllability and deterrence value of such a 
method of warfare, factors which made them comparatively less reliable, and therefore 
more difficult to sell to some – although not all – in the US military (Goldman, 2009). 
With this in mind there are at least five possible factors leading to Nixon’s decision. 
One account is that biological weapons, whilst difficult and unpredictable, could 
potentially have been developed by smaller states that were devoid of sufficient 
resources to acquire nuclear weapons technology. Certainly, a U.S. State Department 
report from 1964 claimed that for “any reasonably modernised state, and even for many 
less developed nations, there are few obstacles in the way of acquiring at least some 
BW and CW capability”. In realist parlance, this could have been seen as enabling 
smaller states to alter the status quo by the acquisition of what was potentially a weapon 
of gigantic effect. In this context, there one could make a case for the decision being 
informed by aspects of compulsory material power; specifically moving towards a ban 
on biological weapons could have stymied the spread of biological weapons to other 
countries (or at least stigmatised their development and use) and avoided the financial 
costs of a biological arms race with the Soviet Union, whilst having little bearing on 
the national security of the US itself because of negligible relative advantage of 
biological weapons for the US.  
A second factor – or set of factors - which may have influenced Nixon’s thinking is that 
of diplomatic acuity on two levels. On the one hand, the act of renunciation and thereby 
the paving of the way for the BWC, can be seen as facilitating a longer term objective 
of further work on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, which were 
argued to be priority of the Nixon administration (Tucker & Mahan, 2009) and indeed 
the BWC is described by Sims (2001) as being rushed and gutted in order to make way 
for SALT. 
On the other hand, the US renunciation can more cynically be viewed as deflect 
international attention away from the use of tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam and, in 
doing so, both outmanoeuvre the Soviets in a propaganda offensive and take off the 
“table an issue that was impeding their intention to continue unconstrained war in 
Indochina” (Leitenberg et al, 2012: 538). The use of chemicals in Vietnam had 
previously been denounced by the Soviets at a meeting of the Disarmament 
Commission as “a crime against humanity” and a “flagrant act of lawlessness” 
(Goldblat, 1971: 237) and more subtly raised in the UN Secretary General’s report of 
1969. As such the motion towards biological disarmament, in this regard, could have 
been seen as a public relations tool with which to shift attention from allegations of 
chemical crimes against humanity and lawlessness, to BW related activity conducted 
by the USSR. This factor alone is unlikely to account for the Nixon decision, however 
the role CBW disarmament in public relations was not unimportant (Chevrier, 2006: 
308). 
Related to this, a third possible reason for the decisions was to mitigate domestic 
political pressure in the US. Over the course of the late 1960s, successive US 
administrations were faced with growing sense of antimilitarism in response to the war 
in Vietnam generally, and the use of herbicides and riot control agents within the 
conflict specifically. This included the generation of two petitions from eminent 
scientists, the latter of which was signed by seventeen Noble Laureates and more than 
5,000 scientist who demanded, inter alia, a reconsideration of American CBW policy 
and an end to the use of herbicides in Vietnam. Attention to CBW escalated further 
over the course of 1968 and 1969 as a result of a series of CBW related accidents and 
mishandled explanations that cumulatively generated a “crush of Congressional, press, 
public, and international criticism of U.S. CBW policies” (Goleman, 2009). The 
renunciation of BW may not have entirely alleviated such pressure, but it certainly 
offered a change in direction that may have had value in assuaging some concerns. 
Indeed, Goldman (2009) suggests “Nixon’s announcement turned out to be a public 
relations boon for the administration, prompting positive responses from the public, 
press, and international leaders”. 
A fourth possible factor was the role of domestic advisors in informing the Nixon 
decision. Amidst the growing domestic criticism of US CBW policy, in the spring of 
1969 several interdepartmental groups were tasked with studying CBW policies. This 
included a study by members of the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), 
which was chaired by Dr Ivan Bennett who had previously participated in the UN 
Secretary General’s panel CBW (see below) with participants including influential 
individuals, such as the renowned geneticist, Matthew Meselson. The PSAC report 
concluded that biological weapons were less predictable, reliable and controllable that 
chemical weapons, further contending that biological agents could “pose serious long 
term dangers if released” and recommended that the US “give up its biological weapons 
capability” (Frank, 1974: 114) 
Although, there was little initial indication that the PSAC committee was going to be 
influential; Forrest Russel Frank (1974) suggests that a combination of good timing, 
weighty technical analysis, and policy acuity cumulatively increased the impact of the 
report. The technical analysis was important as a counterweight to rival reports from 
other interagency groups, which “omitted some technical factors that would weaken 
their case for biological weapons”. Concerning the policy acuity, Frank (1974) 
suggested, this was achieved through taking “the middle road politically” and finding 
a third way between the polarised conclusions of other studies but also to some extent 
hedging bets by applying pressure in areas where progress could more likely be 
achieved. Not all assessments agree on the neutrality of the PSAC report, notably 
Allen’s (2007) thesis concludes that one of the key factors in the Nixon decision was 
the PSAC review, further adding that this had been “… marred by extreme bias, in 
that … the only persons knowledgeable about CBW who participated in the review 
were anti-CBW activists”. Nevertheless, both Frank and Allen point to the importance 
of PSAC in stimulating the Nixon decision and highlight the role of individuals, such 
as Bennett and Meselson, in paving the way for the renunciation of biological weapons 
in the US. 
Finally, the work of international organisations may also have had a bearing on the 
decision. For example, the UN Secretary-General’s 1969 report concluded that: [...] 
scientific and technological advances of the past few decades have increased the 
potential of [...] biological weapons” adding that “Once the door was opened to this 
kind of warfare, escalation would in all likelihood occur”. The report recommended 
“call[ing] upon all countries to reach an agreement to halt the development, production 
and stockpiling of all [... CBW]. Similarly, a report by the WHO concluded that it is 
imperative to find new ways of abolishing any presumed need for this militarily 
orientated research as soon as possible. It is difficult to prove that either the UN 
Secretary General or the WHO exerted any form of compulsory power on the USSR or 
the US; however, such organisations may have served as important sources of 
productive power which influenced the framing of the problem of biological (and 
chemical) weapons.  
Perhaps more significantly, the participation of US experts in the UN Secretary 
General’s advisory group producing the report - including individuals such as Bennett 
who later led the PSAC study on CBW - made them “fully aware of hostile foreign 
perception of US CBW policies” and Frank (1974) suggests that US experts were 
“subject to embarrassing critiques of America’s role in the proliferation of CBW and 
in endangering the viability of a previously effective international sanction on its use”. 
As such the exposure to international criticism during the process of developing the UN 
SG report may have hardened opposition to BW amongst certain influential experts in 
the US. 
From the Soviet Perspective, initial concerns over the separation of chemical and 
biological weapons (UN, 1969: 24) appear to have diminished for reasons not entirely 
clear. Whatever the reasoning by the early 1970s, the notion of a prohibition on 
biological warfare accepted; in part, it has been suggested, because of the limited 
verification provision in the subsequent US proposal. Certainly, Leitenberg et al (2012) 
quote senior Soviet representative as later stating that the BWC was signed: 
for propaganda purposes… the military’s reaction was to say go ahead and sign 
the convention: without international controls, who would know anyway? They 
refused to consider eliminating their stockpiles and insisted upon further 
development of these weapons. 
The idea of separation was nevertheless criticised by several other states including 
Bulgaria (CCD, 1969B) and Sweden (CCD, 1969C) amongst several others who sought 
to recover elements lost from the original UK proposal for a biological weapons 
convention. Ultimately, this endeavour failed with Canada, the UK, Italy and the 
Netherlands conceding to accept the joint text devoid of an explicit prohibition on use 
in an act, which Hainworth later remarked, “reflected the spirit of compromise to the 
maximum extent” (Sims, 2001). 
As such the BWC can, on the one hand be seen as the exercise of compulsory power 
by the two Cold War superpowers, yet on the other hand, the possibility of compulsory 
power to achieve this was itself a result of a number of other actions by other states, 
organisations and, indeed, individuals, who collectively paved the way for the genesis 
for the BWC. It thus illustrates both the complexity of meaningful studies of the 
exercise of power in the formulation of arms control and disarmament arrangements, 
but also, perhaps, the limits of materialistic realist (compulsory power) orientated 
thinking in international relations.  
 
Power and the Evolution of the BWC 
The entry into force of the BWC in 1975 engendered a partial shift from compulsory to 
institutional power in the biological weapons regime, something most obviously 
manifest in the use (or misuse) of the consensus rule. Certainly at BWC meetings, such 
as the quinquennial review conferences and more recently the annual meetings of States 
Parties during the intersessional processes, final reports are based on consensus. In 
effect this means that such Final Documents are the result of negotiations and, therefore, 
often reflect what Becker-Jakob (2013) has described as “compromises and, more often 
than not, package deals and bargains”. 
Such compromises rarely appear to emerge from the open recalcitrance of a single state 
seeking to publicly block action. This has occurred, most notably in 2001 when the US 
(2001) announced the termination of a decades work on the development of a Protocol 
to the BWC, arguing the Protocol was not “capable of achieving the mandate set forth 
for the Ad Hoc Group, strengthening confidence in compliance with the Biological 
Weapons Convention.” Yet even as the US bore the brunt of the decision to terminate 
the work of the Ad Hoc Group, it was apparent that several states that had previously 
demonstrated strong objections to aspects of the Composite Text hid behind US policy 
(Lennane, 2006). 
However, more often than not, more subtle forms of exercising institutional power are 
employed. This includes the use of delaying tactics or halting the negotiations; raising 
divisive issues at a late stage in meetings in order to scupper progress (Revill, 2012); 
coordinated group negotiating strategies, including the formation of what Littlewood 
(2005: 198) terms an ‘unholy alliances’ or ad hoc coalition of ‘like-minded states’; and 
exploiting group dynamics and/or proxy actors to achieve specific objectives. Notably 
the significance of consensus is such that certain states, including most recently the 
Russian Federation (2014) have even challenged consensus agreements ex post facto 
through a process of citing confusion and chaos in last minute negotiations as 
generating misunderstandings over the status of certain papers, effectively requesting 
the downgrading of parts of what some had believed to be consensus text agreed by 
States Parties, to a Chairman’s report prepared under his own responsibility. 
In the context of the BWC this is particularly problematic. The convention agreed in 
the early 1970s remains a relatively succinct disarmament agreement, which fits 
comfortably on three sides of A4 paper. The brevity in the provisions of the convention, 
compared with something such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, entail a degree 
of ambiguity in the expectations of states parties under the convention with matters of 
clarity, change and capacity obfuscating what it means to be in compliance with the 
BWC and what states parties can expect of each other.  
In terms of clarity, the obligations under the BWC, as with other international 
agreements – indeed perhaps more so because of the succinct nature of the BWC text - 
are ambiguous. For example: is it acceptable under Article I to conduct controversial 
‘Gain of Function’ research on infectious agents which enhance inter alia, lethality, or 
speed of spread of the agent; what ‘necessary measures to prohibit and prevent’ (BWC, 
1972) biological weapons must States Parties undertake to be compliant with Article 
IV and; how do states promote international cooperation and ‘avoid hampering’ the 
economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention as variously 
perceived as necessary under Article X?  
Such ambiguity in the clarity of the text is compounded by what Chayes and Chayes 
(1993) have termed a “temporal dimension” of arms control and disarmament treaties. 
Such agreements do not operate in a vacuum, but rather must evolve and adapt within 
a changing context. Particularly important in this regard are changes in the capacity, 
geography and practices of science and technology that have the potential to challenge 
the scope of the convention and generate both positive and negative implications for 
several aspects of the BWC. Equally changes in security, such as the perceived growing 
salience of bioterrorism in the 21st century or a shift towards small scale, tactical use of 
biological weapons by states, also require States Parties to adapt and perhaps reconsider 
what is required under Article IV.  
Such issues are more than academic musings; rather they can result in considerable 
differences in the expectations and objectives of different States Parties under the 
convention and by implications, significant difficulties in reaching agreement by 
consensus not least because States Parties disagree on significant values and objectives. 
This is particularly acute in relation to Article X and Article VI of the BWC, which deal 
with international cooperation and national implementation respectively.  
In terms of the former, peaceful cooperation, it is notable that there is very little 
evidence of discussion around Article X (which deals with peaceful cooperation) of the 
BWC during the process of negotiations (Littlewood, 2005). Rather the text for the 
Article X, which appears to have origins in a Swedish proposal, was “generally found 
constructive” (SIPRI, 1971). However, since its inception, Article X has become 
increasingly problematic with significant time allotted to - or usurped by, depending on 
ones point of view - discussions around this aspect of the convention. This trend has its 
roots in three factors: first, the perceived increase in the potential of biotechnology to 
deal with society issues; second, the increasingly vocal role of a collective of Non 
Aligned Movement actors emphasising a development dimension to the biological 
weapons regime; and, third, linked to the above is the development of Western export 
control regimes (such as the Australia Group) which are argued by some to hamper 
international cooperation.  
In terms of national implementation, Article IV obligates states to “take any necessary 
measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, 
or retention” of biological weapons (BWC, 1972). The obligation to ‘prohibit’ is 
relatively straight forward pointing as it does to national legislation; but the obligation 
to prevent is unclear, amounting, as it does, to an obligation of result. This has become 
considerably more important in the wake of the Anthrax letter attacks in 2001, which 
have heightened concern over bioterrorism for many western states. Indeed, such was 
the concern over non-state actor use of biological weapons, western states have pushed 
for greater activity in the implementation of article IV, including the implementation of 
measures such as, inter alia, codes of conduct, education of life scientists and biosafety 
and biosecurity measures. This arguably represents a considerable expansion of the 
perceived obligations under article IV and a shifting or expansion of the goal posts for 
the BWC; and perhaps reflects an increase in efforts exert structural power by 
governments on national institutions, something which has been met with some albeit 
limited success.  
The divergent expectations and emphasis on these two articles has led to the exercise 
of institutional power on several occasions, but perhaps most significantly during the 
Sixth Review Conference in 2006. Prior to the Conference Western states sponsored 
the notion of a national implementation “action plan”; however, many in the Non 
Aligned Movement were reluctant to accept such a proposal. Accordingly over the 
course of the conference, the NAM “tabled an additional draft Plan of Action on 
Implementation of Article X… [and]… several NAM states made their acceptance of 
the first action plan [on national implementation] conditional on greater emphasis on 
Article X implementation” (Becker, 2007). The impasse was a source of considerable 
tension in the meeting and effectively resulted in Ambassador Khan, the Pakistani 
Ambassador who presided over the Sixth Review Conference, cutting a Gordian knot 
by scrapping action plans for both Article X and the National Implementation at the last 
minute in order to achieve consensus, albeit by deletion (Guthrie, 2006). 
At the subsequent Seventh Review Conference in 2011, institutional power was evident 
again with the emergence of a divide between the Western group and the Non-Aligned 
Movement albeit one with “only a handful of leading states serving as protagonists on 
either side”; as Becker (2013) notes, “the issue of national implementation was known 
to be a priority for many Western states and hence provided ground for strategic 
proposals and bargaining chips”. In contrast for many NAM states much of the focus 
was on Article X and manifest in an effort to “… keep the scope of Article X as broad 
and generic as possible met calls by Western countries to narrow it and put special 
emphasis on single aspects such as disease surveillance”. (Becker, 2013). 
Attempts to find a compromise between these two positions and advance the convention, 
through for example efforts to revise the intersessional working processes faced the 
difficulty of blocking by an ad hoc collective alliance of ‘like-minded states’ that rallied 
against a number of proposals. As such to paraphrase Barnett and Duvall (2005) “the 
institutional core of biological disarmament, while seemingly resting on the production 
of joint gains through cooperation or coordination, also entails the substantial operation 
of institutional power”. 
This is not to suggest that institutional power is the only form of power exhibited in the 
BWC, there are also perhaps more subtle exercises of productive power. For the 
hegemonic conceptualisations, or reconceptualisation, of key terms, such as 
“biosecurity” can be seen as supporting certain interests over others; over the course of 
the first and second intersessional process biosecurity – at least in the BWC context - 
became conceptualised along the lines of laboratory biosecurity – with its narrower 
focus on protecting materials and equipment from theft and misuse – rather than a 
broader definition of biosecurity as posited by Indonesia:  
Biosecurity is not limited to protecting laboratory-based pathogens and toxins 
from theft [...] such a narrow strategy has limited value in Indonesia, where 
dangerous pathogens are not only located in laboratories, but can also be found 
readily in nature. (Halim, 2004: 13) 
This is more than a matter of semantics. The linking of ‘biosecurity’ with laboratory 
biosecurity, albeit only in the context of the BWC, nevertheless has reframed the 
concept in a manner which served the interests of western states concerned over the 
possibility of bioterrorism, at a cost to those who saw biosecurity as more broadly 
concerned with the security of biological entities and the prevention of and response 
to natural outbreaks of disease. Such an approach perhaps reflects the exploitation of 
productive power in the sense that this reflects the “discursive … fixing of meanings, 
and the terms of action, of world politics”. 
 
Still “Muddling Through” at Forty 
In April 2015, the BWC celebrated its Fortieth Birthday. Despite the trials and 
tribulations, the convention has weathered the storm well and now boasts some 173 
States Parties and nine signatory states, committed to biological disarmament, . 
However, for all its success, the BWC is facing somewhat of an asymptotic problem in 
which the easier challenges have been resolved and dealing with the remaining 
challenges and issues will get progressively more difficult. For example, further 
achievements in “universalisation” of the BWC will require overcoming the standoff 
between Middle Eastern States, such as Israel, Egypt and Syria that remain outside the 
BWC proper. Developing means and methods for verification will require opening up 
longstanding political and technical differences over whether and how verification can 
be achieved. Achieving any movement on verification will also require dealing with 
the continued descent into fragmentation of Article X and agreeing a package of 
measures.  
Indeed, there is a case to be made that by seeking to plaster over the cracks of the 
convention and achieve consensus agreement, successive generations of diplomats 
have stored up disagreements in the BW. Resolving such issues is unlikely to be easy 
and, until there is greater international cohesion around the problem to which the BWC 
is the solution (or a systemic shock to the stability of the biological weapons regime) 
the future of the BWC is increasingly likely to be characterised less by ‘giant’ steps 
towards a paradigm shift; but more a process of incremental steps or a process of what 
Lindblom has termed ‘muddling through’.  
For some academics and friends of the convention as well as those delegations with 
more ambitious objectives for biological disarmament, such a future is likely to be 
disappointing. Similarly, for tax paying citizens of states parties, the costs of biological 
disarmament in terms of time and financial resources, perhaps rightly raise the question 
of whether people should expect that the States Parties to the BWC should be “taking 
bigger steps in policy … no longer fiddling” (Lindblom, 1979). 
Disappointing as this may be, it is largely unavoidable and arguably not such a bad 
thing entirely with three factors suggesting there is little option but for States Parties to 
‘muddle through’. First, there are deep-rooted disagreement over “many critical values 
or objectives” (Lindblom, 1959) related to the convention; secondly, as a result of such 
deep rooted differences and the diffusion of institutional power within the BWC forum 
there will remain “a structure of veto powers that makes even incremental moves 
difficult and insufficiently frequent” (Lindblom, 1979). Thirdly, the “multilateral 
disarmament and arms control community of practice is necessarily a cautious and 
conservative one” (Borrie & Randin, 2005: 111); understandably so, after all who wants 
a maverick when it comes to issues of international security generally but particularly 
those linked with weapons that have a potentially gigantic effect.  
Nevertheless, such a process of muddling through is not entirely negative as ‘muddling 
through’ at least entails moving somewhere, albeit through a cautious “sequence of trial 
and error” (Lindblom, 1979). Furthermore, it entails moving forward multilaterally, 
thereby bringing in a geographically representative set of views on aspects of biological 
disarmament. Doubtless many practitioners would argue that less is more, yet the same 
factors that frustrate multilateral diplomacy and dictate incremental paths, also 
contribute to their enduring value and legitimacy across the globe.  
Moreover, such a steady progress may well be preferable to paradigm shifts, at least 
based on past efforts towards a paradigm shift in the BWC, most notably during the 
work on the protocol in the lost decade of the 1990s. Not only did this process fail to 
bear fruit and arguably took the BWC backwards because of the ensuring tension 
between states parties, it also perhaps generated missed opportunity costs. There are 
also perhaps practical reasons why incrementalism may be more helpful that paradigm 
shifts, not least as to paraphrase Lindblom (1979), incrementalism “helps maintain the 
vague general consensus on basic values … that many people believe is necessary for 
widespread voluntary acceptance of [the BWC]“. Furthermore, it does so in a manner 
that is not necessarily slow:  
… incrementalism in politics is not, in principle, slow moving. It is not 
necessarily, therefore, a tactic of conservatism. A fast-moving sequence of 
small changes can more speedily accomplish a drastic alteration of the status 
quo than can an only infrequent major policy change. If the speed of change is 
the product of size of step times frequency of step, incremental change patterns 
are, under ordinary circumstances, the fastest method of change available. 
Achieving any semblance of a “fast-moving sequence of small changes” leading to a 
“drastic alteration” in the direction of BWC in the absence of any existential shock 
looks unlikely in the immediate future. The possibility of course remains that “a skilled 
reformer may learn paths of indirection and surprise, thus reaching objectives that 
would be successfully resisted were his program more fully revealed” (Lindblom, 1979); 
however this would require steering a path between fundamentally contested views on 
the problem of biological warfare and different expectations of what the BWC is 
intended to do.    
 
Conclusions 
This paper began by sketching out the variety of explanations as to how poison - and 
later biological weapons – became somehow seen as something special, perhaps even 
taboo. Such a status may have been achieved because of the particular means whereby 
biological weapons affect the body from within; yet the origins of the ‘taboo’ may lie 
in the early application of productive power to stigmatise certain weapons over others 
in a manner that serves the interests of certain parties.  
Whatever the historical reasoning for the obloquy associated with poison, it is clear that 
over time this become codified in international agreements, most notably the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925 and the 1975 Biological Weapons Conventions. Such agreements are 
often seen as the product of compulsory bilateral power exercised by blocs on either 
side of the Iron Curtain and whilst there is logic to such a framing of the origins of the 
BWC; the emergence of early proposals for the prohibition of biological warfare have 
their origins not in compulsory power alone, but also in the discrete exercise of 
productive forms of power through epistemic communities and other collectives of 
individuals playing a key role in shaping and informing domestic debate around certain 
means and methods of warfare.  
Since the conclusion of the BWC there has to some extent been a shift form compulsory 
to institutional forms of power, with States Parties to the BWC exploiting the rules and 
procedures of BWC meetings – but specifically the tradition of consensus. In 
circumstances where biological weapons are a low security priority for many countries 
but conversely biotechnology is seen as increasingly important in responding to social 
and economic challenges, this has resulted in an increasingly incrementalist process in 
the evolution of the BWC with veto powers and diplomatic procedures necessitating 
the BWC is current ‘muddling through’ rather than aspiring to any form of paradigm 
shift. Indeed, frustrating as it may be - particularly those more ambitious states parties 
seeking to enhance the convention - incrementalism is perhaps the only approach to 
building the biological weapons regime in conditions where power is institutional 
power is diffused and the interests of states varies considerably.  
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